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xGlossary of terms
Default retirement age The age at which an employer can legally retire an employee. 
The current default retirement age is 65.
Direct tax Tax paid by households on their income.
Indirect tax Taxes on consumption, including but not limited to VAT, fuel 
duty, and tobacco and alcohol Duties.
Government investment Gross fixed investment by the government.
Government consumption Government spending on goods and services.
Government interest payments The interest paid by government on the current stock of gross 
government debt.
Nominal gross domestic product The value of goods and services produced in an economy 
within a year at current market prices.
Participation rate The proportion of the working age population who are active in 
the labour market (in work or actively seeking work).
Real gross domestic product The value of goods and services produced in an economy  
 within a year adjusted for changes in the level of prices.
Social Transfers Transfers from the government to households, including, but 
not limited to, the State Pension, child benefit, Jobseekers’ 
Allowance, Income Support and Incapacity Benefit.
State Pension age The age at which an eligible resident or UK citizen may begin 
to claim the state pension from the government.
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1Summary
This report presents findings from research, conducted by the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research (NIESR) on behalf of the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP). NIESR were 
commissioned to simulate the macroeconomic effects from extending working lives using NIESR’s 
global econometric model, National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM). 
Research remit
The DWP requested a number of different scenarios to evaluate the effects of extending working 
lives. The baseline used in this project is a forecast that includes the announced increases in State 
Pension age1. In order to put this work into context the DWP also requested some counterfactual 
analysis to evaluate the potential losses to the economy if the planned increase in State Pension age 
and equalisation of women’s State Pension age with men’s did not take place. 
The core of the work commissioned by the DWP concerned the potential impact from future 
extensions of working life. There are a significant number of scenarios that could be run within this 
general context. The set of scenarios were chosen to enable a comparison of different plausible 
variants to be made given the current plans for the increases in the State Pension age. As well as 
providing macroeconomic results from an extension of working life, they were designed to highlight 
the differences between less and more radical changes. These include increasing working lives by 
one, two or three years; implemented at different speeds and over differing future time horizons 
(starting now or in ten years time). Sensitivity analyses around these results were also undertaken 
and focused on two phenomena: the hours worked by those that extend working lives and the 
speed at which investment is increased in response to the expansion of the supply of labour. 
Modelling the impact of extending working lives
Extending working lives increases the supply of labour, raising the potential levels of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and consumption. In addition, extending working lives is likely to lead to 
an improvement in the position of the public finances, in particular, through boosting tax revenues. 
If markets work well and the extension is well planned, providing time for people to adjust their 
retirement decisions, the impacts on the economy and employment would be both positive and 
large. This report provides an analysis of the effect of such an extension of working life. A number 
of assumptions are required in the modelling analysis. Consumers, exchange rates and financial 
markets are assumed to be forward looking and respond to expected changes in interest rates. 
Labour market bargainers take account of both past and future inflation in setting wages, and 
unemployment rates will return to equilibrium after a shock, but at a lag. The real wage adjusts to 
the supply of labour. The UK is assumed to be a small open economy; an increase in the workforce 
leads to a lower real exchange rate in equilibrium in order to ensure that extra output can be sold. 
Output is determined in the long run by the supply of labour and the level of technical progress, 
and the capital stock adjusts to maintain the capital output ratio at its equilibrium level. In addition, 
we note that those near retirement work about three quarters of average hours worked by those 
currently in employment. The forecast baseline used for the analysis is NIESR’s October 2009 
forecast (the underlying population projections are the 2008-based population projections from the 
Office for National Statistics (ONS)) and has the rate of price inflation on target at around two per 
1 The work was completed before the announcement that the State Pension age would rise to 
66 from April 2020.
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2cent per annum over the medium term. A number of sets of assumptions on the government sector 
are used. The core set keeps government consumption on baseline and tax rates are constant. 
All benefits are up-rated in-line with the plans available at the time the baseline was created. 
If somebody becomes part of the population of working age rather than retired, they can be 
employed, unemployed or inactive. Given that benefits are up-rated in-line with plans the amount of 
benefit received by the unemployed changes with the number of unemployed people. Payments to 
those on other benefits also change in line with the numbers claiming those benefits.
Key findings
Counterfactual analyses
Before examining the macroeconomic effects of extending working lives a simple counterfactual 
analysis of the impact from not raising the State Pension age as currently planned (plans as of end 
2009) was undertaken. In this counterfactual it is assumed that there would be no increase in the 
age at which people retire, and as such it is a ‘worst-case’ scenario. Retirement ages may well still 
have risen, even though the State Pension age does not, as a consequence of longer expected lives. 
This counterfactual includes not equalising women’s and men’s State Pension ages (men’s State 
Pension age is held at 65 and women’s at 60). These assumptions imply a significantly smaller 
working age population over the period from 2010. The working age population would be over three 
million lower by 2030. The initial effect is small, but it rapidly accumulates as the State Pension age 
for women is due to rise by five years over the period 2010-2020. Real GDP would likely be almost 
six per cent lower than it otherwise would have been by 2030, with the level of employment around 
seven per cent lower. 
In this analysis government consumption is kept on baseline and tax rates are constant. Total tax 
receipts would be lower than currently projected. The benefits received by different groups, be they 
of working or state pensions age continue to be up-rated in-line with the plans implicitly underlying 
the baseline. Government spending would be higher than projected on the baseline. On the basis of 
these assumptions the results from the simulations imply the government’s budget balance would 
have been 3.5 per cent of GDP worse in 2030 than anticipated with the legislated State Pension age 
change. 
Using the Labour Force Survey, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) estimates that around 1½ per 
cent of the working age population withdraw from the labour force through early retirement. The 
impact on the economy from assuming no such early retirement was simulated from 2000. In the 
absence of early retirement, these simulations suggest that nominal GDP would have been one per 
cent (£14 billion) higher than it otherwise was in 2009. Public finances would also have improved. 
The results suggest a £4 billion improvement in tax revenues, with taxes on household incomes the 
main contributor. 
The main results
The core scenario is a one year increase in working life for the UK population that is gradually phased 
in over the period 2010-2014. This change is combined with a gradual one year increase in the State 
Pension age for men and women, expanding the population of working age. By 2014 the working 
age population will have increased by 1.75 per cent. Over this period the average age of withdrawal 
from the labour market by women is expected to rise and it is assumed that this continues, with 
their average age of withdrawal converging with men’s by 2020. As a result the increase in the 
labour force is smaller than the increase in the working age population. It is assumed that the 
impacts of the labour force increases are anticipated by both consumers and producers. Consumers 
Summary
3know that they will have to save less for retirement, and will spend more in advance of their later 
retirement, producers will be aware they need more capital to go with the increased future labour 
force, and hence will invest more now.
A one year extension of working life increases real GDP by around one per cent about six years after 
its implementation, which is around 80 per cent of the increase in the labour force. The government 
budget would improve by 0.6 per cent of GDP, and consumption per capita would be more than 
one per cent higher than on the baseline. Employment would start to rise immediately. In the 
core scenario, by 2014 employment is likely to have risen by 1.6 per cent (467,000). As markets 
work slowly, and output follows the increase in the labour force, initially unemployment might be 
expected to rise, albeit by a small amount, as flows through the labour market will be affected. The 
unemployment rate might temporarily rise and in the core scenario peaks at 0.2 percentage point 
two years after implementation. Subsequently, the unemployment rate would be expected to return 
to baseline implying no effect on the rate of unemployment by 2014. 
Alternative scenario: a three year increase in working lives
An analysis of a three year increase in working lives was requested by the DWP since the long-term 
plans as they stand are for the State Pension age to be increased by three years to 68 by  
March 2046. This was implemented with the three year extension in working life spread over a 
decade. In comparison to the one year increase, it has about three times the impact on real GDP in 
the long-run. Over the first five years the increase in working life looks broadly similar to the core one 
year extension. However, it is noticeable that the impact on the economy over the first five years 
is greater in the three year scenario. It is the anticipation of further labour force expansions that 
increases demand for output by both consumers and producers in the short run. Consumers know 
that they will have to save even less for retirement under the three year extension than the one year 
extension, and will spend more in advance of the change in retirement ages, producers will be aware 
they need more capital to go with the increased future labour force, and hence will invest more now. 
Conclusions
In the absence of any changes to the State Pension age by 2030 the working age population would 
be to be three million less than currently projected. Consequently, the future level of real GDP would 
be around six per cent lower than is the case with current plans for the State Pension age. 
A one year increase in working life phased in over the next few years would raise the labour force 
available in the UK. In the short run, we would expect there to be a temporary increase in the rate 
of unemployment as the economy adjusts to this expansion of labour but after four years all the 
additional labour would be absorbed. By that time the level of real GDP would be boosted by around 
one per cent. Consumption would rise more than output, as savings could be lower given that 
people face shorter periods of retirement.
A one year increase in working life with an equivalent increase in the State Pension age would reduce 
spending and increase tax receipts (both from higher incomes and more consumption) than would 
otherwise been the case. If government current expenditure is assumed to be fixed to baseline then 
a one year increase in average working life would improve the government budget balance by 0.5 
per cent of GDP after ten years and by almost one per cent after 25 years.
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41 Introduction
There has been much discussion of the impact of increasing life expectancy on saving and 
retirement decisions. Since 1990, male life expectancy has been rising at three years a decade, 
with smaller increases for women. At the same time entry into the labour force has been delayed 
by increases in participation in post compulsory secondary and tertiary education. As a result, the 
proportion of life spent in work has been declining, and funding pressures for non working years 
have been increasing. This report looks at the impacts on output, consumption and the government 
budget from inducing or allowing people to work longer than they currently do. 
The concentration of work can be partly explained by economic phenomena. We highlight three 
here. The first factor is that for some people earning capacity may decline with age. This means 
that, as people age, the cost of work, in terms of leisure foregone, becomes increasingly expensive 
relative to the benefit they gain from working. Working becomes less attractive and, when people 
feel they can afford an acceptable living standard without working, they retire. The second reason 
for people to choose the bunching of leisure in retirement is the potential for receipt of a pension, 
which means that their possible consumption is increased and, therefore, its marginal utility is lower 
at any given level of earnings. 
The marginal utility of leisure is much less affected, making it more likely that people will choose not 
to work. The third factor is that concentrated working increases people’s earning capacity as skills 
and knowledge are temporarily enhanced. These factors provide reasons for people to take relatively 
more leisure late in life and thus to retire. Although most individuals are in a position to make their 
own decisions about their retirement, not all are able to do so. Employers behaviour, contracts, case 
law and legislation, which we might describe as institutions, that induces retirement at a specific 
age or makes the choice to work longer more difficult, may also induce some bunching in retirement 
decisions. Indeed, bunching of retirements at specific ages could be seen as an indicator of the scale 
of constraints on behaviour.
These observations immediately allow us to identify factors which are likely to encourage people to 
retire later than they currently do. First of all, a delay in the date at which normal state benefits are 
available has the effect of lowering income prior to this date if retirement plans are not adjusted, 
making retirement now more expensive, and hence less likely. The effect is bound to be most 
marked on the poorest people, because, in proportionate terms, it is a much larger reduction in 
their expected income than it is for rich people, ceterus paribus. Secondly, poor investment returns, 
perhaps a consequence of a more general reduction in rates of return or as a result of taxes on 
income from capital, will mean that people need to save higher proportions of their labour incomes 
to achieve any given level of retirement consumption. A probable response to lower returns is both 
that people will reduce their consumption in retirement relative to that in working life and also 
that they will delay retirement. This effect is bound to be more marked on rich people than on poor 
people since the latter do not save very much anyway. The age of retirement that people choose 
will also depend on the expected generosity of the state benefits in their retirement, with a more 
generous path for future benefits inducing people to retire earlier.
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5Figure 1.1 The percentage withdrawing from the labour market, by age and sex 
Currently there is significant bunching around the current State Pension ages of men and women 
(see Figure 1.1). Almost two-fifths of men retire between ages 64 to 66, while two-fifths of women 
retire between ages 59 and 62 inclusive. If the retirement decisions were not influenced by the 
institutional factor mentioned above then we might expect a rather less-peaked distribution. The 
objective of recent policy announcements is to induce people close to the current State Pension age 
to delay the point at which they withdraw from the labour market. Consultations on the restriction 
of pension tax relief, reducing the generosity of tax relief on pensions should mean that for a given 
level of saving will provide less of a pension than had previously been expected2. Such adjustments 
should induce an extension in working life for some middle and higher income earners as they 
adjust to maintain their pension level. The government have also announced a consultation on 
when to bring forward the increase in the State Pension age to 66 (DWP, 2010), which will induce 
some extension of working life. But more immediately the government have announced their 
intention to abolish the Default Retirement Age from next year lifting one of the barriers to those 
who desire to work beyond the age of 653.
2 See the consultation documents available at: 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/consult_pensionsrelief.htm
3 See http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/employment-matters/strategies/default-retirement for 
details.
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6The DWP requested a number of different scenarios to evaluate the effects of extending working 
lives. The baseline used in this project is a forecast that includes the announced increases in State 
Pension age4. In order to put this work into context the DWP also requested some counterfactual 
analysis to evaluate the potential losses to the economy if the planned increase in State Pension age 
and equalisation of women’s State Pension age with men’s did not take place. 
The core of the work commissioned by the DWP concerned the potential impact from future 
extensions of working life. There are a significant number of scenarios that could be run within this 
general context. The set of scenarios were chosen to enable a comparison of different plausible 
variants to be made given the current plans for the increases in the State Pension age. As well as 
providing macroeconomic results from an extension of working life, they were designed to highlight 
the differences between less and more radical changes. These include increasing working lives by 
one, two or three years; implemented at different speeds and over differing future time horizons 
(starting now or in ten years time). Sensitivity analyses around these results were also undertaken 
and focused on two phenomena: the hours worked by those that extend working lives and the 
speed at which investment is increased in response to the expansion of the supply of labour.
In this paper we discuss the impacts on the economy from raising the age at which people 
retire. Later retirement may be driven by a number of factors, such as the removal of constraints, 
the abolition of a default retirement age in labour contracts, or from changing tax and benefit 
inducements. Increasing the State Pension age is only one way of inducing people to work longer, 
but we include it here as one of the factors affecting decisions. We use the National Institute model 
of the UK economy in NiGEM on a baseline projection to 2059 in order to undertake this evaluation. 
The model is described in Appendix A. In Chapter 2 of the report we discuss our assumptions in 
the modelling exercise and the current plans for the State Pension age over the next 40 years. 
In Chapter 3 we discuss the impacts that expected increases in retirement ages that flow from 
currently agreed increases in the State Pension age and other currently enacted legislation might 
have on the economy. In Chapter 4 we look at the impacts on output, employment, consumption 
and the government budget of people extending their working lives by one year. 
Appendix B presents the detailed tables from the core simulations. We note that those near 
retirement work fewer hours a year than the average of the population of working age, and in order 
to take account of this we assume that those who choose to exit later work around three quarters 
of normal hours, and that later retirement does not change earlier behaviour. We examine the 
sensitivity of our results to these assumptions in Chapter 5. In Appendix C we look at the impact on 
output and employment from accelerating the adjustment of the capital stock to changes in labour 
input. The speed at which the capital stock adjusts is crucial to the speed at which the expansion of 
labour supply is absorbed by the economy. The capital stock is expanded through an increase in net 
investment, raising overall final demand in the economy. In Chapter 5 we also evaluate the impacts 
of extending working lives by three years over the next decade, whilst Appendix D discusses the 
impacts of the same policy over the period 2020 to 2050. Chapter 6 concludes.
 
4 The work was completed before government announced their intention to raise the State 
Pension age to 66 from April 2020 (see DWP, 2010).
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72 Assumptions used in the  
 modelling
2.1 Assumptions: current pension policy plans
We have undertaken three core simulations in this project, each progressively extending working life. 
We use a baseline where we have implemented the increase in the State Pension age for women 
between 2010 and 2019 as well as those for men and women that are described in Figure 2.1 in 
subsequent years. The underlying data for the creation of our baseline was obtained from ONS  
mid-2008 population projection. Labour force projections and assumptions about participation rates, 
which depend on the labour force as a proportion of the population of working age, have to take 
account of the fact that women retire at 62.4 currently and hence a reasonable number of women 
in the labour force are not included in the population of working age women. On our baseline the 
State Pension age is used to define the working age population and the average retirement age is 
used to define the labour force in constructing our baseline. 
Figure 2.1 Retirement assumptions on our baseline 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the effective retirement ages for men and women on our baseline taking into 
account current legislation for a further three increases in the State Pension age. We assume that 
the effective age of retirement rises in line with changes in the State Pension age after 2020. The 
size of the men’s, women’s and total populations of working age are plotted in Figure 2.2.
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Assumptions used in the modelling
8From the second quarter of 2010 there is a gradual increase in women’s State Pension age and we 
also assume in retirement ages. The birth date of those covered by the State Pension age change 
rises by one month every two months (by one year every two years) for a decade, as is detailed in 
Table 2.1 for the first one year increase in women’s State Pension ages. From Table 2.1 we can see 
that all women born on or before 5 November 1950 will be of pensionable age at mid-2011. This will 
include all those aged 61 at mid-2011, plus some aged 60. Of those aged 60 at mid-2011, those 
born between 1 July 1950 and 5 November 1950 will be of pensionable age, but those born between 
6 November 1950 and 30 June 1961 will be of working age. This pattern continues throughout the 
decade and by 2020 the men’s and women’s State Pension age equalise at 65.
Table 2.1 The onward march of women’s retirement ages
Period within which woman’s birthday falls  Day pensionable age attained
6 April 1950 to 5 May 1950  6 May 2010 
6 May 1950 to 5 June 1950  6 July 2010 
6 June 1950 to 5 July 1950  6 September 2010 
6 July 1950 to 5 August 1950  6 November 2010 
6 August 1950 to 5 September 1950  6 January 2011 
6 September 1950 to 5 October 1950  6 March 2011 
6 October 1950 to 5 November 1950  6 May 2011 
6 November 1950 to 5 December 1950  6 July 2011 
6 December 1950 to 5 January 1951  6 September 2011 
6 January 1951 to 5 February 1951  6 November 2011 
6 February 1951 to 5 March 1951  6 January 2012 
6 March 1951 to 5 April 1951  6 March 2012 
Source: Government Actuary’s Department (http://www.gad.gov.uk/Demography%20Data/Population/2006/
methodology/pensionage.html).
Given that the women’s average age of exit from the labour market is already 62.4 we assume that 
each of these one year increments in the State Pension age is associated with an increase in the 
average exit age for women by half a year. Hence the percentage rise in the labour force of women 
is around half the increase in women’s population of working age. As we define the participation rate 
of women as the labour force divided by the population of working age it declines on our baseline, 
as does the overall participation rate, as we can see from Figure 2.3.
Assumptions used in the modelling
9Figure 2.2 Projections for the population of working age
We assume that by 2020 men and women exit the labour market at the State Pension age of 65, 
which is marginally above men’s current exit age of 64.5. At the time of writing there is no legislation 
to increase the State Pension age for men between 2010 and 2020, and therefore, we have not 
made an adjustment for the participation rate of men5. It is to be hoped that men’s retirement ages 
will start to rise in response to both shortfalls in wealth as a result of the crisis in the economy and 
because perceptions of life expectancy after retirement become more realistic.
5 The work was undertaken before the government announced its intention to the increase in 
State Pension age to 66 in 2020.
Assumptions used in the modelling
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Figure 2.3 Participation, the population of working age and the labour force
2.2 Assumptions: economic assumptions underlining the  
 simulations
The economic assumptions used in NiGEM that underpin this report are:
1 Consumers are forward looking, but they discount the future at a higher rate than the market 
interest rate. The existence of such a myopia premium means that a rise in taxes now that 
is matched by a cut in taxes in the future will reduce consumption now (we do not assume 
Ricardian consumers).
2 We assume exchange rates and financial markets are forward looking and respond to expected 
changes in interest rates. If interest rates are expected to be lower in the future as a result of 
a policy change then bond and equity prices will rise and the exchange rate will decline now, 
bringing some of the effects forward.
3 We use price level targeting in our analysis, as we discuss changes in the nominal value of 
tax revenues into the future. As Barrell, Hall and Hurst (2006) show standard Taylor Rules can 
leave the price level permanently changed in response to an increase in supply, as can regimes 
based in nominal targets such as the money stock. This can give misleading results for absolute 
changes in nominal magnitudes of tax takes and benefit payments. Our forecast baseline has 
the rate of price inflation on target at around two per cent per annum, and this is maintained in 
the simulations by an active price level targeting rule.
Assumptions used in the modelling
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4 Labour market bargainers take account of both past and future inflation in setting wages, and 
the unemployment rate returns to equilibrium after a shock, although this takes some time. The 
real wage adjusts to the supply of labour.
5 We assume that the UK is a small open economy and that an increased workforce leads to a 
lower real exchange rate in equilibrium in order to ensure that extra output can be sold. 
6 Output is determined in the long run by the supply of labour and the level of technical progress, 
and the capital stock adjusts to maintain the capital output ratio at its equilibrium level. The 
implications of changing the speed of adjustment of the capital stock are investigated.
7 We assume that productivity levels of those who remain in the workforce are on average the 
same as the rest of the population, independent of their age. In most occupations it appears 
that experience offsets declining physical capacity until late in working lives. 
8 As our focus is on the impacts on the public finances from increasing working lives, we use a 
number of sets of assumptions on the government sector, but our core set keeps government 
consumption on baseline and tax rates constant. Benefit rates for the unemployed, the retired 
and those on other benefits unchanged in real terms from the path on our baseline.
Assumptions used in the modelling
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3 Retirement counterfactuals
3.1 Simulating the effect of no increases in State Pension age
Figure 3.1 Reduction in the working age population if State Pension age and  
 retirement ages do not change 
The impact of holding State Pension ages constant at 60 and 65, for women and men respectively, 
would be significant, as we can see from the impact on the working age population in Figure 3.1. By 
2020 the labour force would be 4.6 per cent smaller than we currently project on our baseline, whilst 
by 2030 it would be 7.1 per cent lower than on our baseline, with the impact rising to eight per cent 
after the (abandoning of the) increase in State Pension age in the mid 2030s. 
The impact on real GDP would be similar, as we can see from Figure 3.2, as labour supply would 
be less and capital would have time to adjust. Over the period 2010 to 2030 growth would on 
average be 0.3 per cent a year lower if we were not to see an increase in the State Pension age and 
the effective age of retirement. As the withdrawal of the planned increase is gradual we would 
expect there to be only a small impact on unemployment, as markets work, and we plot the effect 
on employment in Figure 3.3. However, the household saving rate rises by 2.5 percentage points 
compared to our baseline by 2020 and by 3.1 percentage points by 2030. Consumption per head 
would be much lower than on our baseline, not only because people would have had to save more 
of their current incomes for longer retirements, but less income would have been generated. We 
estimate that by 2030 consumption per head in the UK would have been around eight per cent 
lower if retirement ages had not been increasing.
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Figure 3.2 Impact on real GDP from a reduction in the working age population if  
 State Pension age and retirement ages do not change
Figure 3.3 Impact on employment from a reduction in the working age  
 population if State Pension age and retirement ages do not change
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As this a counterfactual exercise we can allow all for any endogenous variations in tax revenues and 
expenditures to feed through into a shift in the position of the public finances. If we assume that 
effective retirement ages were fixed, and tax rates, benefit up-rating and government consumption 
plans are as on our baseline then, by 2030 the government would need to borrow 3.5 per cent more 
of GDP (see Figure 3.4). Around a fifth of this is due to higher interest payments from the greater 
accumulation of debt. Figure 3.5 plots the contributions of taxes and spending on pensions and 
interest payments to the overall deficit increase.
Figure 3.4 Impact on the government budget balance from a reduction in the  
 working age population if State Pension age and retirement ages do  
 not change
The participation rate of those aged 50+ has increased, on average, by 0.54 percentage points over 
the decade to 2008. Underlying the baseline is the assumption that this trend continues in the 
future. This continued increase in the rate of labour market participation has a significant effect on 
the economy. Given the population projections produced by the ONS, a continuous 0.54 percentage 
point increase in the participation rate boosts the level of real GDP by 3.9 per cent by 2030. The DWP 
requested an alternative analysis, where participation for this age group increased at a more rapid 
pace. The impact of a one percentage point increase in the participation rate is broadly double the 
0.54 percentage point increase scenario, with real GDP around 7.2 per cent above baseline by 2030.
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Figure 3.5 Sources of impact on the budget in 2030 from a reduction in the  
 working age population if State Pension age and retirement ages do  
 not change
 
3.2 The effect in the economy by 2009 if there had been no early 
 retirement
We were also interested in the impact on the economy from a change in retirement ages, so that no 
men retire before 65 and no women retire before 60 in 2009, but those who work longer continue 
to do so. To implement this scenario we use statistics on the stock of those whom have retired 
early to create the exogenous shock to apply to the participation rate. Given the adjustment lags 
in the economy we have applied this shock from 2000, which allows output, employment and tax 
receipts to adjust to the new equilibrium given our standard assumptions about the responsiveness 
of private and public sector capital stocks. Figure 3.6 reports the percentage of the working age 
population who have retired early (i.e. before State Pension age) for the period 1993Q2 to 2009Q36. 
These people are currently defined as economically inactive in the Labour Force Survey data. The 
participation rate on our baseline would be increased from 2000 in proportion to the series reported 
in Figure 3.6 if there had been no early retirement over the decade to 2009.
6 Men can retire at 60 with an occupational pension but in terms of extending working lives we 
define early retirees as those who retire before they have reached State Pension age.
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Figure 3.6 The percentage of the working age population who have retired  
 before reaching State Pension age
Figure 3.7 The impact on nominal GDP and tax revenues in 2009 from raising the 
 average retirement age to include no early retirement
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Real GDP in 2009 would be almost 1.5 per cent higher since the capital stock will have adjusted to 
the expansion of the labour supply. We apply the same assumptions as in the ‘core simulations’ 
described in Section 2.2. We assume price level targeting, while tax rates are assume to remain 
unchanged from our baseline projections and real government consumption expenditure are fixed 
at its current trajectory. As Figure 3.7 shows, tax revenues would have been around £4 billion greater 
than currently expected due mainly to higher income tax receipts and more indirect tax revenues 
from greater consumption. Figure 3.8 reports the impact of this scenario on government spending. 
The main change is to spending on government interest payments. With a boost to tax revenues 
and a slight fall in spending due to lower transfer payments and a lower price level in the short 
term, the accumulation of government debt is significantly lower. This is turn reduces the scale of 
government interest payments by around £4 billion per annum in 2009.
Figure 3.8 The impact on government spending in 2009 from raising the average 
 retirement age to include no early retirement
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4 The impact of a one year  
 increase in working life
This section reports on the core of the work for the project. The scenarios were chosen to enable 
a comparison of different plausible variants on extending working lives. They were designed to 
highlight the differences between less and more radical changes, including increasing working lives 
by one, two or three years; implemented at different speeds and over differing future time horizons 
(starting now or in ten years time). Sensitivity analyses around these results are also discussed.
4.1 The construction of the scenarios
We first increase the age of effective retirement by one year for both men and women progressively 
from April 2010 to March 2014, basing the increments in each quarter on the size of the relevant age 
group. The State Pension age, which determines the population of working age, and also the age at 
which retirement takes place increase by a one month every four months for men over this period. 
The State Pension age increases by three months every four months for women, including the two 
months for every four months that is already included on the baseline from 2010. However, the 
effective retirement age for women, which determines the labour force, is assumed to increase only 
half as fast as the State Pension age. By the end of this period women will retire at age 64.5 instead 
of 63.5 in March 2014, and men will retire just before 66 as compared to just before 65. By 2020 
the average retirement age of men and women is assumed to reach 66, and by 2026 their average 
retirement age is assumed to have risen to 677. 
Figure 4.1 Baseline and the one year increase in women’s retirement ages
7 This is one year greater than the plans for the State Pension age that existed up until the recent 
government announcement that they intend to increase in the State Pension age to 66 in 2020.
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The evolution of the effective retirement age and the population of working age are plotted in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 along with 4.3 and 4.4 below. The impact on effective labour input, rather than 
the labour force is however, smaller, as we assume that those who do not retire work only three 
quarters of average hours of those in employment.
Figure 4.2 Baseline and the one year increase in men’s retirement ages
Figure 4.3 The working age population of women under the baseline and the one 
 year increase in working life
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As we assume a rise in State Pension age is matched by an equal rise in the effective age of 
retirement, the rise in the male workforce is proportional to the rise in the working age population. 
We assume that the hours worked by the retained workforce are the same as those of the age group 
one year below. However, it is possible that people plan to run down their hours for several years 
before retirement and they may choose to delay the start of the rundown. If this adjustment were 
to start one (calendar) year later as a result of an increase in the age at which people retire then the 
increase in labour input would be greater.
Figure 4.4 The working age population of men under the baseline and the one  
 year increase in working life
We undertake several pieces of sensitivity analysis. The first varies the hours of work undertaken 
by those retained in the workforce, firstly raising them half way to economy wide average hours 
and secondly reducing them by the same amount. This is discussed in the subsequent section. We 
also investigate the impact of varying the assumption concerning the speed of the adjustment 
of the capital stock. The results from this variant analysis are reported in Appendix C. The capital 
stock simulations involve both accelerating and slowing the speed of private sector capital stock 
adjustment, and this has implication for unemployment and hence for the path of the government 
budget deficit. We also change our assumptions on the speed of adjustment of the public capital 
stock making it adjust at the same speed as the private sector stock and hence inducing the 
economy to reach its new equilibrium more rapidly. 
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4.2 The core scenario
We implement the core scenario as a one year increase in working life, gradually phased in as 
discussed in Section 4.1 under the assumptions discussed in Chapter 2 along with our hours 
assumption. Figure 4.5 plots the absolute increases in the population of working age. Figure 4.6 
plots the increase in the working age population as a percentage of the baseline population of 
working age. This clearly shows that this is a gradual increase in the average retirement age. Figure 
4.7 shows the maximum size of the increase in the working age population if the one year increase 
in working life were to be in place in the year in question. Potential increase in the working age 
population is larger in the early part of this decade than in the last few years of the decade because 
the size of the relevant cohort shrinks over the period. Given the unequal distribution of population 
across different age groups it is perhaps unsurprising that the increase is less than two per cent. 
Indeed it is only by 2014 that the increase in the working age population stabilises at around  
1.75 per cent, with the size of the percentage effect depending on the size of the relevant cohort in 
the year in question. The impacts of the labour force increases are anticipated both by consumers 
and by producers. Consumers know that they will have to save less for retirement, and will spend 
more in advance of the change in retirement ages, producers will be aware they need more capital 
to go with the increased future labour force, and hence will invest more now. In addition to these 
direct effects financial markets will know that the labour force will increase and that this will put 
downward pressure on wages, prices and interest rates in the future, and hence the exchange rate 
will fall marginally as soon as the policy is implemented, and output will be stimulated. 
Figure 4.5 The increase in the working age population due to a one year  
 extension in working life
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Figure 4.6 The increase in the working age population due to a one year  
 extension in working life, per cent increase in the working age  
 population
The detailed output from the one year increase in working life scenario is reported in Tables B.1 
to B.8 (Appendix B). Table B.1 gives the increase in GDP due to a one year increase in average 
retirement ages in real and nominal terms. Table B.1 also details the impact on consumption and 
the change in the household saving rate, which declines by around 0.75 percentage points in the 
long run after a one year extension to working life. Household incomes are increased by around one 
per cent by the extension in working life. The boost to household consumption is even greater: a one 
year increase in working life boosts real consumption by almost 1.25 per cent as household incomes 
are higher, but less saving is required to fund retirement. 
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Figure 4.7 The maximum increase in the working age population from a one year 
 increase in working life
 
Figure 4.8 The effect on real GDP from raising the population of working age  
 through extending working lives by one year
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A one year extension of working life implemented immediately increases real GDP by around one per 
cent extra after about six years after its implementation, which is around 80 per cent of the increase 
in the labour force. Figure 4.8 plots the effects on the level of real GDP. These would be smaller for 
increases in working lives later in the decade, as the relevant cohort is smaller, but as there would 
be more time to adjust the capital stock in advance the full effects may come through more quickly. 
Table B.2 detail the impacts on employment and labour input (hours multiplied by employment) 
which is also plotted in Figure 4.9. 
As markets work slowly, and output follows the increase in the labour force, initially unemployment 
might be expected to rise, albeit by a small amount, as flows through the labour market will be 
affected. As we can see from Table B.2, employment starts to rise immediately in all scenarios 
and in the one year scenarios by 2013 employment has risen by 1.3 per cent8. The unemployment 
rate might temporarily rise and in this core scenario peaks at 0.2 percentage point two years after 
implementation. Subsequently, the unemployment rate would be expected to return to baseline 
implying no effect on the rate of unemployment from 2014 onwards.
An increase in the size of the workforce without any change in technology available is likely to 
lead to a decline in real wages in order that more of the same bundle of goods can be sold on the 
world market. In our core and fast adjustment cases real wages fall by around 0.3 percentage 
points to help absorb the increased workforce. Each quarter almost a million people flow through 
unemployment, and some will find it marginally more difficult to find work, but this is only a 
temporary phenomenon. Indeed, Elsby and Smith (2010) show that outflows from unemployment 
to employment have held up well in the recent recession. As we have noted the size of the economy 
has been expanded, but given that the population size is fixed this implies an increase in per capita 
GDP from the extension of working life. 
8 The results presented in this paper are not comparable to the evidence contained in the 
White Paper on bringing forward the increase in State Pension age (Department for Work and 
Pensions, 2010). The effect on employment is larger in this report for a number of reasons: our 
work concerns the extension of working life, not just raising the State Pension age. The White 
Paper does not allow for any effect through the adjustment of the capital stock. We model an 
immediate effect, rather than a change that begins in 2018.
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Figure 4.9 The effect on the unemployment rate and the labour input from  
 raising the population of working age through extending working  
 lives by a year
The empirical studies of the labour market on which NiGEM is based suggest that an increase in 
labour supply is absorbed in four years. Barrell and Dury (2003) discuss the wage equations on the 
model, and show that unemployment is determined by the factors affecting the wage bargain 
and by productivity. Real wages adjust to equilibrium, and the speed of adjustment depends on 
the degree to which wage setters look forward or backward in relation to price developments. The 
equilibrium level of employment will depend on the real wage given by the bargain, and will depend 
on the labour demand curve as derived in Barrell and Pain (1997). These equations are regularly 
updated and tested for structural changes. As with migration, which is analysed using NiGEM in 
Barrell, Gottschalk, Kirby and Orazgani (2009) and Barrell, FitzGerald and Riley (2010) an increase in 
labour supply from later retirement can be expected to be absorbed first by real wages adjusting 
downward and then by labour demand increasing as capital is put in place and domestic and foreign 
demand increases or is diverted to cheaper UK goods.
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Figure 4.10 The effect on the government budget balance from raising the  
 population of working age through extending working lives by  
 one year
 
The effects on the public sector finances are detailed in Tables B.3 to B.8. As we can see from 
Tables B.3 and B.4, the increase in direct tax revenues (in billions on Table B.4) is larger than the 
increase in indirect tax, although the percentage increase (on Table B.3) in indirect taxes is larger 
as consumption, which is the base for indirect taxes rises more than output as consumers need 
to save a lower proportion of their incomes. This increase in consumption relative to output will be 
reflected in a slight deterioration on the balance of payments current account, as is discussed in 
Barrell, Hurst and Kirby (2009). This in part reflects the general need for a smaller stock of financial 
assets in preparation for a shorter period of retirement, and the composition of wealth will shift 
toward domestic assets. Corporation tax receipts also rise more than in proportion to income as a 
change in the labour supply will affect the capital share in the model as the estimated elasticity of 
substitution is around 0.5. It takes time for corporate tax revenues to rise as profits will increase only 
as the economy adjusts fully to equilibrium and they are collected with a lag. Table B.5 compares 
the proportionate effects of individual taxes on the overall increase in revenue, and it is clear that 
corporation taxes contribute only ten per cent or so of the gain with the rest being shared in nearly 
equal terms by (larger) direct tax receipts and indirect taxes. 
 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
20
31
20
32
20
33
20
34
20
35
20
36
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 o
f G
DP
 (d
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 b
as
e)
 
The impact of a one year increase in working life
27
We assume government consumption is fixed in real terms, and only changes in nominal terms if 
its deflator (or rather the public sector wage rate) is affected. Government investment reacts, albeit 
slowly and hence spending rises in nominal terms. Transfers to individuals decline, but the fall is 
only around half of the increase in taxes in 2020 for instance. As we can see from Tables B.6 and 
B.7, government interest payments fall, and this fall becomes more important over time as the debt 
stock is paid off. Figure 4.10 plots the effects on the government deficit as a per cent of GDP (with 
forecast baseline tax rates, forecast baseline government consumption and other items responding 
endogenously). 
The improvement in the deficit continues over the whole of our period of analysis because we 
assume tax rates remain fixed. An improvement in the budget balance relative to baseline implies 
a smaller debt stock in the future. As a consequence, government interest payments decline 
incrementally. The reduction in the deficit is smaller than in Barrell, Hurst and Kirby (2009) in part 
because we assume here that working lives are extended by one year, whereas previously we had 
assumed effective working life rose by one year, which given hours near retirement are below 
average, actual working lives rose by one and a half years. In addition, in that paper we assume 
government investment plans are set along the forecast baseline trajectory rather than responding 
to higher output. As a result of our assumptions here a one year increase in working life would 
improve the deficit by 0.5 per cent of GDP by around 2014 (see Figure 4.10). This number is largely 
dependent on the assumptions made about tax and spending.
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5 Variant analyses 
5.1  The importance of the assumptions of average hours worked 
 by those extending their working lives
We have undertaken a sensitivity analysis of the impact of our hours worked assumption, reducing 
hours for the retained individuals to 61 per cent of average hours, and also raising it to 87 per cent 
of average hours. We multiply these changes by the per cent increase in population of working age 
(and hence labour force given no assumptions were made about participation) in our scenario where 
we have one more year on working life.
The more hours worked by those retained in the workforce the larger the effect on GDP, as we can 
see from Figure 5.1 which plots the effects on real GDP. Figure 5.2 plots the impacts of the changes 
in the hours worked assumption on the government deficit. The more hours people work, the higher 
their incomes and the more tax they pay. 
Figure 5.1 GDP effects of one year extension of working lives: variations in the  
 assumption on hours worked
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Figure 5.2 Effects on the government deficit from extending working lives by  
 one year: variations in the assumption on hours worked
5.2 An alternative scenario: the impact of a three year increase  
 in working lives
The three year increase in working lives is implemented on the same basis as the one year increase 
discussed in Chapter 4. The three year extension in working life is spread over a decade. Figure 5.3 
plots the absolute increase in the population of working age from the three year increase in working 
life. Figure 5.3 also includes the one year increase for comparison. Figure 5.4 plots the impact on GDP 
from the three year increase in working life alongside the effect from a one year increase in working 
life. It is clear from this that the three year increase in working life has about three times the impact 
in the long-run. 
However, it is noticeable that the impact over the first five years is higher under the three year 
increase than in the one year increase in working life. This is because of the anticipation of labour 
force increases by both consumers and producers. Consumers know that they will have to save less 
for retirement under the three year extension than the one year extension, and will spend more 
in advance of the change in retirement ages, producers will be aware they need more capital to 
go with the increased future labour force, and hence will invest more now. As in the case of the 
one year shock there are indirect effects from financial markets who anticipate the increase in the 
labour force and putting downward pressure on wages, prices and interest rates in the future. As a 
consequence the exchange rate will fall marginally further in the three year extension to working life 
than in the one year, stimulating GDP further. 
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Figure 5.3 Increases in the working age population due to an extensions in  
 working life by three years
 
Figure 5.4 The real GDP effect from raising the population of working age  
 through extending working lives by three years
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 b
as
e
Three years One year
 
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
20
31
20
32
20
33
20
34
20
35
20
36
Note: The impact of a one year increase in working life is included as a comparison.
 
Th
ou
sa
nd
s
Three years One year
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
3,000
20
10
Q
1
20
10
Q
4
20
11
Q
3
20
12
Q
2
20
13
Q
1
20
13
Q
4
20
14
Q
3
20
15
Q
2
20
16
Q
1
20
16
Q
4
20
17
Q
3
20
18
Q
2
20
19
Q
1
20
19
Q
4
20
20
Q
3
20
21
Q
2
20
22
Q
1
20
22
Q
4
20
23
Q
3
20
24
Q
2
20
25
Q
1
20
25
Q
4
20
26
Q
3
20
27
Q
2
20
28
Q
1
20
28
Q
4
20
29
Q
3
20
30
Q
2
Note: The impact of a one year increase in working life is included as a comparison.
Variant analyses
31
Each extension of working lives increases real GDP by around one per cent extra after about six years 
after its implementation, which is around 80 per cent of the increase in the labour force. Figure 5.4 
plots the effects on real GDP in both the one year and three year scenarios. As markets work slowly, 
and real GDP follows the increase in the labour force, initially unemployment might be expected to 
rise, albeit by a small amount as flows through the labour market will be affected. 
Figure 5.5 The effect on the government budget balance from raising the  
 population of working age through extending working lives by three  
 years
 
 
As in the case of the one year increase in working life we assume government consumption is fixed 
in real terms, and only changes in nominal terms if its deflator (or rather the public sector wage 
rate) is affected. Government investment reacts, albeit slowly, and as a consequence spending rises 
in nominal terms. Transfers to individuals decline, but the fall is only around half of the increase 
in taxes in 2020 for instance. In both the one year and three increases in working life government 
interest payments fall. The contribution of the lower interest payments to the improvement in the 
government’s budget balance as the debt stock is paid off. Figure 5.5 plots the effects of both the 
one year and three year increases in working life scenarios on the government deficit as a per cent 
of GDP (with forecast baseline tax rates, forecast baseline government consumption and other items 
responding endogenously). 
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6 Conclusions
Significant measures have been undertaken to extend working lives, and these will be having an 
impact on the prospects for economic growth. In the absence of any of the currently legislated 
changes to State Pension age and changes in retirement behaviour we have seen, by 2030 the 
working age population would be three million less than currently projected. We undertook a 
counterfactual analysis of what would have happened if there were to be no increase in State 
Pension age over the next 40 years. Our results suggest that the future level of real GDP would be 
around six per cent lower than is currently projected to be the case by 2030. With fixed expenditure 
plans and tax rates the government’s budget balance would be worse by around 3.5 per cent of GDP 
by the same date.
A one year increase in working life phased in over the next few years would raise the labour force in 
the UK by around 1.75 per cent, varying from year to year depending on the size of the cohort.  
In the short run we would expect there to be a temporary increase in the rate of unemployment as 
the economy adjusts to this expansion of labour. Extra workers can be absorbed if wages are flexible 
and through normal turnover in the labour market. A key determinant of the speed of adjustment 
would be the extent to which businesses react and provide the necessary capital with which the 
expanded labour force is able to work. 
Our results suggest a one year increase in working life would, after six years, boost the level of real 
GDP in the economy by above one per cent. We have assumed that those that extend their working 
life by one year work around three quarters of average hours worked by others, much as those near 
retirement choose to do. A one year increase in working life would boost real consumption by over 
one per cent after five as incomes would be higher and less saving would be required for retirement. 
A one year increase in working life would also result in an increase in the tax receipts (both from 
higher incomes and more consumption) than would otherwise been the case. If government current 
expenditure did not react to higher output then a one year extension to working life would improve 
the government budget balance by 0.5 per cent of GDP after four years and by almost one per 
cent after 25 years. The improvement in the government’s budget balance would continue to rise 
because the debt stock would continue to decline in our scenario, and result in lower government 
interest payments. There are of course other ways to deal with the structural change in the public 
finances that longer working lives would bring, and issues of choices over what to consume and 
when are discussed in Barrell, Holland and Kirby (2010).
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Appendix A 
The NiGEM model
We utilise the NiGEM model in a version that has similar long run properties to the dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium models in use by institutions such as the Bank of England9. GDP (Y) 
is determined in the long run by supply factors, and the economy is open and has perfect capital 
mobility. The production function has a constant elasticity of substitution between factor inputs, 
where output depends on capital (K) and on labour services (L) which is a combination of the 
number of person in work and the average hours of those persons. Technical progress (tech) is 
assumed to be labour augmenting and independent of the policy innovations considered here
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Appendix A: The NiGEM model 
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We assume forward looking behaviour in production and because of ‘time to build’ 
issues investment depends on expected trend output four years ahead and the forward 
looking user cost of capital. However, the capital stock does not adjust instantly, as 
there are costs involved in doing so that are represented by estimated speeds of 
adjustment. The equilibrium level of unemployment is the outcome of the bargaining 
process in the labour market, as discussed in Barrell and Dury (2003), and the speed 
of adjustment depends on (rational) expectations of future inflation. Financial markets 
follow arbitrage conditions and they are forward looking. The exchange rate, the long 
rate and the equity price will all ‘jump’ in response to news about future events. Fiscal 
policy involves gradually adjusting direct taxes to maintain the deficit on target, but 
we assume that taxes have no direct effect on the labour supply decision. Monetary 
policy involves targeting inflation with an integral control from the price level, as 
discussed in Barrell, Hall and Hurst (2006) and inflation settles at its target in all our 
simulations.  
 
Perhaps the most important feature of the model for our discussion is that consumers 
react to the present discounted value of their future income streams which we may 
call total wealth (TW), although borrowing constraints may limit their consumption to 
their personal disposable income in the short run. Total wealth is defined as  
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where TW is real total wealth, Y is real income, T are real taxes, and the suffix t+1 
indicates an expected variable which is discounted by the real interest rate rrt and by 
the myopia premium used by consumers, myt. The equation represents an infinite 
forward recursion, and permanent income is the sustainable flow from this stock. 
Total wealth and permanent (PI) income can be linked by the stock flow relationship 
where γ is the rate of return on TW. 
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9 The Bank of England Quarterly model is discussed in Harrison et	al. (2005). NiGEM is discussed in 
Barrell, Holland and Hurst (2007), Barrell, Hurst and Mitchell (2007) and in other papers at 
www.niesr.ac.uk. NiGEM does not impose maximising equilibrium conditions in the same way as 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models, but has the same steady-state equilibrium properties. 
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issues investment depends on expected trend utput four years ahead and the forward 
looking user cost of capital. How v r, the capital stock does not just instantly, as 
there are costs involved in doing so t at re represented by estimated speeds of 
adjustm nt. The equilibrium level of unemployment is the outcome of the bargaining 
process i  the labo r market, as discuss d in Barrell and Dury (2003), and the speed 
of adjustment depends on (rational) expectatio s of future inflation. Financial arkets 
follow arbitr ge co itions nd they are forward looking. The xchange rate, the long 
rate and the equity pric  will all ‘jump’ in response to news about future events. Fisc l 
policy involves gradually a justi g direct taxes to maintain the deficit o  target, but 
we assume that taxes hav  no irect eff ct on the labour supply de isi . Monetary 
policy involves t rgeting i f tion with an i tegral c ntrol from h  price l vel, as 
discussed in Barrell, H a  Hurst (2006) a d nflatio  set les at its target i  all our 
simulations. 
 
Perhaps the most important feature of the model for our discussion is that consumers 
react to t  present discount d value of their future income streams which we ay 
call total wealth (TW), although borrowing constraints may limit their consumption to 
their personal disposable income in the short run. Total wealth is defined as  
 
))1)(1/((1 tttttt myrrTWTYTW    
 
where TW is real total wealth, Y is real income, T are real taxes, and the suffix t+1 
indicates an expected variable which is discounted by the real interest rat  rrt and by 
the myopia premium used by consumers, myt. The equation repr sents an infinite 
forward recursion, and permanent i come is he sustain ble flow from this st ck. 
Total wealth and permanent (PI) income can be li ked by the stock flow relationship 
where γ is t e rat  of retur  on TW. 
 
tt TWPI *  
 
                                                 
9 The Bank of England Quarterly model is discussed in Harrison et	al. (2005). NiGEM is discussed in 
Barr ll, Holland and Hurst (2007), Barrell, Hurst and Mitchell (2007) and in other paper  at 
www.niesr.ac.uk. NiGEM does not impose maximising equilibrium condit ons in the same way as 
Dynam c Sto hastic eneral Equilibrium models, but has the same steady-state equilibrium properties. 
9 The Bank of England Quarterly model is discussed in Harrison et al. (2005). NiGEM is discussed 
in Barrell, Holland and Hurst (2007), Barrell, Hurst and Mitchell (2007) and in other papers at 
www.niesr.ac.uk NiGEM does not impose maximising equilibrium conditions in the same way 
as Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models, but has the same steady-state equilibrium 
properties.
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Although consumers know their total wealth and hence their permanent income, they may not 
consume it all as they are either risk averse or face a probability of death (ρ) in each time period and 
also a probability (τ) that they will not make the transition from working to not working. If life span 
is uncertain, then consumers will have precautionary savings as discussed in Blanchard and Fisher 
(1989). If the length of working life is also uncertain then they may pay a small premium to insure 
themselves against early retirement, this premium falls with an increase in working lives. During 
working years consumers save and in retirement use their interest income and run down assets. The 
saving rate will depend, amongst other things, on the proportion of life that they expect to work, the 
level of consumption they prefer in retirement and on their desire to leave bequests. In a stationary 
economy consumption will equal permanent income, and the savings rate will fluctuate around a 
mean level of zero. The gross stock of financial wealth will depend on the saving rate and on the 
number of years individuals expect to be retired10. Given that there is an optimal wealth to income 
ratio, WR, in an economy growing at g the saving rate will be g*WR higher to sustain this equilibrium 
ratio; implying consumption will be lower than permanent income. 
Total wealth will also change when asset prices change or when accumulation changes. Non-
human wealth may rise when, for instance, house prices rise and this may increase consumption 
in the short term even though real output may not have risen. We presume that consumption is 
determined by forward looking behaviour in the long term, but short term adjustment depends upon 
a number of factors. As Barrell and Davis (2007) show, changes in financial (dlnNW) and especially 
housing wealth (dlnHW) will affect consumption (C)11. Their estimates suggest the impact of changes 
in housing wealth have five times the impact of changes in financial wealth in the short run. Barrell 
and Davis (2007) also show that adjustment to the long run equilibrium shows some inertia as well. 
Al Eyd and Barrell (2005) discuss borrowing constraints, and investigate the role of changes in the 
number of borrowing constrained households. It is common to associate the severity of borrowing 
constraints with the coefficient on changes in current real incomes (dlnRPDI) in the equilibrium 
correction equation for consumption. We may write our equation for dlnC as: 
	 dlnC
t
	=	λ(∏lnC
t-1
	–	b
0
	–	lnPI
t-1
)	+b
1
dlnRPDI
t
+b
2
dlnNW
t
+b
3
dlnHW
t
where the long-run relationship between lnC and lnPI depends upon the equilibrium savings rate, 
and this relationship forms the long run attractor in an equilibrium correction relationship. We 
should note that permanent income, PI, is a forward looking variable. The logarithmic approximation 
is explained in Barrell and Davis (2007).
Policy reactions are important in the determination of speeds of adjustment. Nominal short term 
interest rates are set in relation to a standard forward looking feedback rule. Forward looking long 
rates should be related to expected future short term rates:
	 (1+LR
t
)	=	∏T
j=1
,	(1+SR
t+j
)1/T
The exchange rate and the equity market are also assumed to be forward looking. 
10 In a stationary world with no risk, no interest rates, a constant level of consumption and no 
bequests, the saving rate will be related to the proportion of life in retirement (τ) and the 
number of years in retirement. For instance if interest rates are zero, one third of adult life is in 
retirement and there are 60 years of adult life then the equilibrium wealth to income ratio will 
be 6.666. It will be lower if interest rates are positive or desired consumption in retirement is 
lower than in work.
11 Throughout d is the change operator and ln is the natural logarithm.
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In order to evaluate the effects of extending working lives on the public finances we need a 
reasonably disaggregated description of both spending and tax receipts. We model corporate (CTAX) 
and personal (TAX) direct taxes and indirect taxes (MTAX) on spending, along with government 
spending on investment and on current consumption, and separately identify transfers (TRAN) and 
government interest payments (GIP). Each source of taxes has an equation applying a tax rate 
(TAXR) to a tax base (profits, personal incomes or consumption). As a default, we have government 
spending on investment (GI) and consumption (GC) rising in line with trend output in the long run, 
with delayed adjustment to changes in the trend. They are re-valued in line with the consumers’ 
expenditure deflator (CED). Government interest payments (GIP) are driven by a perpetual inventory 
of accumulated debts. Transfers to individual are composed of three elements, with those for the 
inactive of working age and the retired depending upon observed replacement rates. Spending less 
receipts is the budget deficit (BUD), which flows onto the debt stock.
	 BUD	=CED*(GC+GI)+TRAN+GIP-TAX-CTAX-MTAX
We have to consider how the government deficit (BUD) is financed. We allow either money (M) or 
bond finance (debt).
	 BUD	=	ΔM	+	ΔDEBT
rearranging gives:
	 DEBT=	DEBT
t-1
	–	BUD	–	ΔM
In all policy analyses we use a tax rule to ensure that Governments remain solvent in the long 
run. This ensures that the deficit and debt stock return to sustainable levels after any shock, as is 
discussed in Blanchard and Fisher (1989). A debt stock target can also be implemented. The tax rate 
equation is of the form:
	 TAXR	=	f(target	deficit	ratio	–	actual	deficit	ratio)
If the Government budget deficit is greater than the target, (e.g. -3 per cent of GDP and target is  
-1 per cent of GDP) then the income tax rate is increased.
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Appendix B 
Tables for the core scenarios
Table B.1 The impact on GDP, household consumption and the saving ratio from 
 a one year increase in working life
 GDP Household consumption Saving ratio
 (a) (b) (a) (b) (c)
2010 0.19 1.51 0.11 2.01 -0.11
2011 0.43 6.24 0.32 4.64 -0.19
2012 0.62 10.64 0.53 7.73 -0.28
2013 0.77 13.92 0.74 10.62 -0.40
2014 0.89 16.03 0.94 13.00 -0.52
2015 0.96 17.46 1.07 14.70 -0.58
2016 0.99 18.65 1.14 16.01 -0.62
2017 1.00 19.58 1.17 17.03 -0.65
2018 0.99 20.32 1.19 17.88 -0.67
2019 0.99 21.02 1.20 18.64 -0.69
2020 0.99 21.80 1.20 19.39 -0.71
2021 0.99 22.73 1.20 20.19 -0.72
2022 0.99 23.71 1.21 21.05 -0.74
2023 1.01 24.72 1.22 21.95 -0.75
2024 1.02 25.84 1.23 22.86 -0.75
2025 1.04 27.29 1.23 23.86 -0.75
2026 1.05 29.13 1.23 25.03 -0.75
2027 1.07 31.09 1.23 26.35 -0.75
2028 1.09 32.93 1.24 27.66 -0.75
2029 1.10 34.60 1.25 28.91 -0.76
2030 1.12 36.01 1.25 30.03 -0.76
Note: (a) per cent difference from base (constant 2005 prices); (b) absolute difference from base (nominal 
prices, £ billion); (c) percentage point difference from base.
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Table B.2 The impact on employment and labour input from a one year increase 
 in working life
 
Employment Labour input
  (a)  (b) (thousands)  (a)  (b) (millions)
2010 0.19 54.75 0.11 53.31
2011 0.54 154.49 0.36 167.26
2012 0.93 268.99 0.63 300.91
2013 1.31 382.84 0.90 433.75
2014 1.59 468.87 1.12 546.11
2015 1.69 502.39 1.24 606.77
2016 1.70 511.57 1.26 625.28
2017 1.69 510.76 1.25 624.96
2018 1.67 507.54 1.24 619.12
2019 1.65 504.85 1.22 613.64
2020 1.63 502.57 1.20 610.07
2021 1.63 505.98 1.20 610.64
2022 1.66 516.39 1.21 619.52
2023 1.70 531.64 1.23 635.37
2024 1.72 543.60 1.26 652.39
2025 1.74 550.89 1.28 664.51
2026 1.75 558.61 1.29 674.16
2027 1.79 573.45 1.31 688.21
2028 1.83 590.19 1.34 707.25
2029 1.87 607.21 1.37 726.55
2030 1.91 622.14 1.39 744.18
Note: (a) per cent difference from base; (b) absolute difference from base.
Table B.3 The impact on tax revenues from a one year increase in working life  
 (percentage difference from base)
 Direct Tax Indirect Tax Corporation Tax
2010 0.10 0.22 -0.01
2011 0.28 0.48 0.50
2012 0.47 0.76 1.12
2013 0.59 1.00 1.38
2014 0.63 1.17 1.47
2015 0.67 1.27 1.46
2016 0.68 1.33 1.37
2017 0.68 1.36 1.24
2018 0.66 1.37 1.13
2019 0.64 1.37 1.04
2020 0.62 1.37 0.98
2021 0.61 1.37 0.95
continued
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Table B.3 (continued)
 Direct Tax Indirect Tax Corporation Tax
2022 0.59 1.37 0.93
2023 0.57 1.36 0.94
2024 0.56 1.36 0.95
2025 0.56 1.36 0.98
2026 0.57 1.36 1.00
2027 0.57 1.37 1.02
2028 0.57 1.38 1.03
2029 0.56 1.38 1.03
2030 0.55 1.37 1.02
Table B.4 The impact on tax revenues from a one year increase in working life  
 (absolute difference from base, £ billion)
 Direct Tax Indirect Tax Corporation Tax Total Taxes
2010 0.30 0.29 0.00 0.59
2011 0.90 0.69 0.15 1.74
2012 1.61 1.15 0.40 3.16
2013 2.08 1.60 0.59 4.27
2014 2.37 1.96 0.75 5.08
2015 2.70 2.22 0.81 5.72
2016 3.02 2.42 0.81 6.24
2017 3.29 2.58 0.79 6.66
2018 3.52 2.71 0.76 6.99
2019 3.69 2.84 0.74 7.28
2020 3.85 2.96 0.74 7.56
2021 3.99 3.09 0.76 7.84
2022 4.10 3.23 0.79 8.12
2023 4.19 3.39 0.83 8.40
2024 4.32 3.54 0.89 8.75
2025 4.53 3.70 0.95 9.18
2026 4.78 3.90 1.02 9.69
2027 5.02 4.12 1.08 10.22
2028 5.25 4.36 1.14 10.75
2029 5.45 4.59 1.19 11.23
2030 5.59 4.80 1.23 11.61
Appendices – Tables for the core scenarios
39
Table B.5 The impact on tax revenues from a one year increase in working life  
 (contribution to total change in tax revenues)
 Direct Tax  Indirect Tax Corporation Tax
2010 0.52 0.49 -0.01
2011 0.52 0.39 0.09
2012 0.51 0.36 0.13
2013 0.49 0.37 0.14
2014 0.47 0.39 0.15
2015 0.47 0.39 0.14
2016 0.48 0.39 0.13
2017 0.49 0.39 0.12
2018 0.50 0.39 0.11
2019 0.51 0.39 0.10
2020 0.51 0.39 0.10
2021 0.51 0.39 0.10
2022 0.50 0.40 0.10
2023 0.50 0.40 0.10
2024 0.49 0.40 0.10
2025 0.49 0.40 0.10
2026 0.49 0.40 0.10
2027 0.49 0.40 0.11
2028 0.49 0.41 0.11
2029 0.49 0.41 0.11
2030 0.48 0.41 0.11
Note: components may not sum to one due to rounding.
Table B.6 The impact on government expenditures from a one year increase in  
 working life (percentage difference from base)
 Social Transfers
Government interest 
payments
Government 
consumption
Government 
investment
2010 -0.19 0.29 -0.08 0.71
2011 -0.50 0.49 -0.02 1.07
2012 -0.84 0.41 0.06 1.20
2013 -1.18 0.13 0.07 1.22
2014 -1.36 -0.28 0.03 1.17
2015 -1.36 -0.71 -0.01 1.10
2016 -1.31 -1.26 -0.03 1.07
2017 -1.26 -1.83 -0.03 1.05
2018 -1.21 -2.38 -0.04 1.04
2019 -1.17 -2.93 -0.05 1.04
2020 -1.13 -3.50 -0.06 1.05
2021 -1.12 -4.09 -0.07 1.06
2022 -1.12 -4.74 -0.08 1.07
continued
Appendices – Tables for the core scenarios
40
Table B.6 (continued)
 Social Transfers
Government interest 
payments
Government 
consumption
Government 
investment
2023 -1.13 -5.42 -0.10 1.07
2024 -1.11 -6.16 -0.12 1.08
2025 -1.08 -6.94 -0.12 1.09
2026 -1.05 -7.77 -0.12 1.12
2027 -1.04 -8.65 -0.11 1.15
2028 -1.03 -9.56 -0.12 1.16
2029 -1.01 -10.49 -0.13 1.15
2030 -1.00 -11.44 -0.15 1.13
Table B.7 The impact on government expenditures from a one year increase  
 in working life (absolute difference from base, £ billion)
Social Transfers
Government interest 
payments
Government 
consumption
Government 
investment
2010 -0.41 0.10 -0.27 0.31
2011 -1.15 0.21 -0.06 0.37
2012 -1.96 0.20 0.19 0.38
2013 -2.83 0.07 0.23 0.38
2014 -3.45 -0.17 0.09 0.37
2015 -3.60 -0.49 -0.05 0.36
2016 -3.66 -0.97 -0.11 0.36
2017 -3.71 -1.53 -0.15 0.37
2018 -3.77 -2.15 -0.19 0.38
2019 -3.84 -2.81 -0.25 0.40
2020 -3.90 -3.54 -0.31 0.43
2021 -4.05 -4.34 -0.36 0.45
2022 -4.26 -5.22 -0.44 0.47
2023 -4.51 -6.18 -0.57 0.50
2024 -4.68 -7.22 -0.70 0.52
2025 -4.75 -8.34 -0.77 0.55
2026 -4.85 -9.55 -0.78 0.59
2027 -5.10 -10.85 -0.78 0.64
2028 -5.36 -12.26 -0.86 0.67
2029 -5.64 -13.80 -0.99 0.70
2030 -5.91 -15.48 -1.18 0.71
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Table B.8 Contribution to the improvement in the government’s budget position 
 from a one year increase in working life (proportion of government  
 budget change)
 Total tax Expenditure less Government 
interest payments
Government interest 
payments
2010 0.68 0.43 -0.12
2011 0.73 0.35 -0.09
2012 0.73 0.32 -0.05
2013 0.67 0.35 -0.01
2014 0.62 0.36 0.02
2015 0.60 0.35 0.05
2016 0.59 0.32 0.09
2017 0.57 0.30 0.13
2018 0.55 0.28 0.17
2019 0.53 0.27 0.20
2020 0.51 0.25 0.24
2021 0.49 0.25 0.27
2022 0.46 0.24 0.30
2023 0.44 0.24 0.32
2024 0.42 0.23 0.35
2025 0.41 0.22 0.37
2026 0.40 0.21 0.39
2027 0.39 0.20 0.41
2028 0.38 0.19 0.43
2029 0.36 0.19 0.45
2030 0.35 0.19 0.46
Note: components may not sum to one due to rounding.
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Appendix C 
Variant analysis: the impact 
from varying the speed of the 
adjustment of the capital stock
This sensitivity analysis concerns the speed at which the private sector capital stock adjusts, and this 
depends, both on incentives available to speed adjustment, and the perceptions of private sector 
decision makers about the prospects for the economy. We choose to emphasise this aspect as policy 
makers can change incentives and persuade decision makers to change their behaviour, and hence 
we wish to emphasise the benefits of so doing.
Figure C.1 GDP effects from extending working lives by one year: different  
 adjustment speeds of the private sector capital stock
In our core case where the age of retirement rises by one year the capital stock has adjusted to its 
new equilibrium by 2020, some six years after the full increase in the labour force is complete. If 
we increase the speed of adjustment so that the capital stock adjustment is completed four years 
earlier output rises more rapidly. If we slow adjustment speeds by the same proportion the capital 
stock is only two-thirds of the way towards its equilibrium in 2020. These differences are reflected 
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in the adjustment of output displayed in Figure C.1, and the difference from forecast baseline 
continues to change because the increase in the population of working age also continues to 
increase, as we can also see from the figure.
The importance of the capital stock adjustment speeds for outturns for the government deficit and 
for unemployment are clear in Figures C.2 and C.3. When private sector capital adjusts more rapidly 
there is an earlier increase in incomes, and therefore, in tax receipts, and also more rapid adjustment 
of unemployment and hence lower transfers, as we can see from Figure C.2. 
Figure C.2 Effects on the government budget balance from extending working  
 lives by one year: different adjustment speeds of the private sector  
 capital stock 
Standard one year increase in working lives Slow adjustment of the capital stock
More rapid adjustment of the private sector capital stock
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Figure C.3 Effect on unemployment from extending working lives by one year:  
 different adjustment speeds of the private sector capital stock 
If the labour market is unchanged a policy that induces people to stay on at work longer than 
they had chosen will lead to a slight rise in unemployment, as flows through the labour market 
will be affected. Employment starts to rise immediately, and unemployment also rises. By 2013 
employment has risen by 1.31 per cent whilst the unemployment rate has risen by 0.2 percentage 
point. More rapid capital stock adjustment reduces the effect on the unemployment rate from the 
minimal 0.2 percentage points to around 0.15 percentage points. The increase in the workforce is 
fully complete by around 2016 in all cases. 
Of course, if labour market adjustment were to be more rapid then unemployment would rise by 
less. It is perhaps more difficult to design labour market policies than investment incentives, but as 
the potential increase in unemployment is likely to be located amongst certain groups with a high 
propensity to flow through unemployment such as the low skilled, young new entrants and women 
returning to the labour force, it should be possible to design polices to speed adjustment further.
Standard one year increase in working lives Slow adjustment of the capital stock
More rapid adjustment of the private sector capital stock
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Figure C.4 Output effects from extending working lives by one year: variations in 
 the speed of adjustment of the public sector capital stock
The speed of adjustment of the public sector capital stock will also affect the speed at which the 
economy adjusts and also the scale of government budget deficit it experiences. This speed is 
clearly a policy parameter for the government, and hence its effects can be subjected to a cost 
benefit analysis. In Figures C.4 and C.5 we plot four scenarios, with the first being our core case of  
a one year increase in retirement ages.
Barrell, Hurst and Kirby (2009) assumed government investment stayed on its core trajectory, and 
we repeat that assumption here, and the improvement to the government budget deficit is larger 
than our other scenarios, but the impact on output is inevitably smaller. If the public sector capital 
stock adjusts at the same pace as the private sector stock then output will grow more rapidly, but 
the deficit will be worse because of higher spending on investment without enough of an increase  
in tax revenues to offset it.
Standard one year increase in working lives
More rapid adjustment of the private and public sector capital stocks
Public sector capital stock adjusts at the same rate as the private sector
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Figure C.5 Effects on the government borrowing from extending working lives by 
 one year: variations in the speed of adjustment of the public sector  
 capital stock
 
 
Standard one year increase in working lives
More rapid adjustment of the private and public sector capital stocks
Public sector capital stock adjusts at the same rate as the private sector
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Appendix D 
Variant analysis: a delay in the 
extension of working lives 
The current legislation for increasing the State Pension age (State Pension age) has been embedded 
into projections for the working age population by the ONS. From 2020 to 2050 there is legislation 
to increase the working live in three stages. These include 2024-25 to 66 years old, 2034-35 to 67 
years old and 2044-45 to 68 years old. The legislation has increased working lives by one year over 
a two year period with the assumption that there is an even distribution of birthdays for any age 
groups. For example the ONS has taken projected number of men and women aged 65-67 years old 
at mid-2025 and they have looked at the distribution of birthdays of these age groups according to 
Table D.1 which shows the date at which pensionable age is attained for those born between 6 of 
April 1959 and 5 April 1960. 
Figure D.1 Incrementing retirement ages by one year every five years to 2032 
After constructing a new baseline scenario out until 2050 we undertook scenarios where we have 
increased the working lives both for men and women over two year’s periods in three stages for both 
five and ten years intervals. These innovations to the age of retirement and are plotted in Figures 
D.1 and D.6, whilst the impacts on the population of working age are plotted in Figures D.2 and 
D.7 The increase in working lives has the same pattern as in the baseline, in that retirement ages 
are increased by one year over a two year period. These changes have to be fitted in with existing 
legislation, and hence they have to be introduced just before or just after an existing extension of 
working lives. For the scenario involving a five year interval between increases we increased the 
working live in 2022, 2027, and 2032. 
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These increments to the population of working age depend upon the demographic structure as they 
are implemented, and in 2022/33 the one year extension raises the labour force by 1.75 per cent, 
whilst in 2027/28 it raise the labour force by 1.83 per cent, and by 1.88 per cent in 2032/33. As with 
our previous experiments we assume those who remain in the workforce put in fewer hours than 
average, and hence the impact on output is smaller than the increase in employment. As working 
lives have been extended, consumption rises more than output and the saving ratio will fall. The 
effects on output depend upon the size of the age group that is drawn in to (or retained in) the 
labour force, and hence the impact on output varies over time, as we can see from Figure D.3. 
Figure D.2 The effects on the population of working age of incrementing  
 retirement ages by one year every five years to 2032 
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Figure D.3 The effects on real GDP of incrementing retirement ages by one year  
 every five years to 2032 
Household consumption starts to rise well ahead of the planned increase in the labour force, as 
forward looking consumers recognise that they need lower levels of saving for retirement. This 
induces some inflationary pressure, and output rises in advance of the increase in labour supply. As 
a result interest rates rise to keep inflation on target. Consequently, government interest payments 
increase. These increased interest payments are sufficient to offset the increased revenue from 
higher consumption, especially given the size of the government debt stock on our baseline which is 
discussed in Barrell and Kirby 2010. 
Appendices – Variant analysis: a delay in the extension of working lives
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 b
as
e
  
 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
20
31
20
32
20
33
20
34
20
35
20
36
20
37
20
38
20
39
20
40
20
41
20
42
20
43
20
44
20
45
20
46
20
47
20
48
One Year Two Years Three Years
50
Figure D.4 The effects on government deficits of incrementing retirement ages  
 by one year every five years to 2032 
The overall impact on the public finances is plotted in Figure D.4, and we have assumed, as above 
that the direct tax rate, and all other tax rates are fixed at their baseline levels, and that government 
consumption stays on plan, Government investment adjusts in line with output and government 
interest payments fall as less debt is issued. In the long-run the improvement in the budget balance 
is around 0.6 per cent of GDP for each year’s increment in working lives. The gains cumulate as a 
declining debt stock reduces government interest payments.
The increase in the labour force is anticipated, but the market is not frictionless, unemployment 
might be expected to rise by just over a fifth of the increment in the labour force, as we can see from 
Figure D.5. However, unemployment returns to its equilibrium within two years as flows through the 
labour market adjust.
As part of the analysis for the DWP NIESR also constructed a set of scenarios where working 
lives were increases by an additional three years over the period between 2020 and 2050. These 
additions were an increment on the existing plan to increase retirement ages in the middle of 
each decade, and they were introduced gradually in 2020, 2030 and 2040. Impacts on output, 
employment and the public finances were similar to those discussed here. Details are available from 
the authors upon request.
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Figure D.5 The effects on unemployment of incrementing retirement ages by  
 one year every five years to 2032 
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